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Abstract In the last decades, transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe have engaged
in strong privatization programs of public utilities. However, a large part of them did not meet
legal and economic conditions needed for a market economy to take place. In this paper, we
study how a ﬁrm producing a public utility and moving from a public ownership to privatization
and thus adopting a proﬁt-maximizing criterion deﬁnes its production plans, when an appropri-
ate regulatory environment is still lacking.
Keywords Privatization, public utilities, dynamic programming
JEL classiﬁcation C61, D21, L11, L33 ∗
1. Introduction
This paper studies the problem of capacity investment in a public utility when a state
owned ﬁrm producing it moves from public ownership to privatization, and when an
appropriate regulatory environment is still lacking.
In the last decades, transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe have en-
gaged in strong privatization programs of public utilities and, more generally, in a dra-
matic change of political and institutional setting. As Hirschhausen and Opitz (2001,
p. 8) aptly put: “An entire sub-continent, including one former superpower, had de-
cided to abandon the state planning system and to replace it by something else, ten-
tatively a market economy. The transformation required the introduction of law as a
stable system of legally and judicially protected entitlements, in contrast to temporary
and volatile governmental commands; moreover, it needed the institutionalization of
an economic constitution, providing incentives for individuals to set up independent,
proﬁt-oriented enterprises in a monetized environment.”
At the time when this privatization started, public utility sectors were faced with
signiﬁcantqualitativeproblems. Securitystandards, environmentalpollutionconstraint
emissions, etc. were not satisﬁed. Further, due to severe budget deﬁcits, not even in-
vestments for renewal or incrementing capacity were undertaken. These privatization
programs were intended as a reaction to the difﬁculty of state-owned entities to meet
the growing needs of customers and to catch the upgrading chances made available by
technological advancements. Indeed, at that time, the idea that private ownership had
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efﬁciency advantages over public ownership and could guarantee a wider access to ba-
sicserviceswascommonly accepted. However, quiteoften theseprogramswere under-
taken when the whole set of conditions at the basis of a market economy (competition
and/or regulation) were not yet ﬁlled up. As a result, a growing public dissatisfaction
with the effects of privatization has emerged.
In this paper, by looking at the components of the optimization problem faced by
a ﬁrm producing a utility, under different types of ownership structures (public own-
ership versus privatization), we try to disentangle the effects which are induced by
a privatization reform which is undertaken outside any regulation constraint. To this
aim, we study hereafter the optimal production plans over time when the possibility of
price manipulation of demand through price is opened to the ﬁrm under analysis. This
possibility, which was not accessible to the originally state owned company producing
a public utility, is at the basis of the proﬁt-maximization behavior for a private mono-
polist operating in a privatized sector. Consequently, this study is necessary whenever
we wish to compare from a theoretical view point ﬁrm’s behaviour under state versus
private ownership structures.
Quite surprisingly, scarce attention has been paid by the theoretical literature to this
topic. Of course, a large body of microeconomic contributions addresses the question
of why ownership matters (Vickers and Yarrow 1988; Stiglitz 1993; Laffont and Tirole
1993; Willig 2000; Tirole 1994; World Bank 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1996; Hart,
Shleifer and Vishny 1997). While clarifying that efﬁciency losses of public ownership
are due to agency problems and political interference in the management of ﬁrms, none
ofthesestudiesspeciﬁcallytakesintoaccount thecharacteristicsofpublicutilities. Not
even this literature is concerned in any detail, if at all, with the timing of reforms of
public utilities privatization, regulation and competition, and its role in producing the
intended results.
Here, after discussing some stylized facts and the theoretical framework in which
the analysis is conceived in Section 2, we move to present the model in Section 3.
Then, we proceed considering the optimal policy as it is determined by a privatized
utility’s proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm in Section 4. In Section 5, we compare the capacity
expansion of the privatized ﬁrm with the one arising if this ﬁrm would be managed by
thegovernment andgiven thiswedevelop somewelfareconsiderations. Wesummarize
our ﬁndings in the conclusion and propose some paths for further research. Details on
computations are in the Appendix.
2. A model for privatized utilities
2.1 Some stylized facts
Privatization effects in transitional economies are quite complex and country-speciﬁc.
While the most part of literature concerned with privatization of medium and large
size ﬁrms shows that privatization positively affect ﬁrms’ performance (Claessens et
al. 1997; Frydman et al. 1999; Beven, Estrin and Schaffer 1999; Nellis 1999), the
debate over privatization in utility sectors is still open. The transformation in these
sectors has been very slow and quite often its pattern has been altered or further slack-
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ened by interest group pressures (Izaguirre 1998; Slay and Capelik 1998). Further, the
transition economies involved in privatization did not share the same starting economic
and political conditions (i.a. Nellis 2003; Sheshinski and L´ opez-Calva 2003; Zhang et
al. 2005). As a consequence, their reform paths cannot be easily described within a
uniﬁed framework.
Nevertheless, several features, in particular a general trend towards increasing pri-
ces, seem to be quite diffused, and changes in proﬁtability in the competitive sector
are generally larger than in the non-competitive sector (Hall 1998; Ran Kim and Horn
1999). In the process design, proﬁt-maximizing entities would have been responsible
to provide high-quality services, to improve the infrastructure networks and renewal
the existing production capacity, even at higher prices (Hare et al. 1999). Indeed, pro-
ponents of privatization were sure that a private involvement in utility services, while
changing the price structure, would have led to stronger investment and thus to greater
capacity and wider coverage. However, the empirical evidence on the reform process
gathered so far does not provide unanimously accepted results on the production capa-
city expansion and not even on its renewal coupled with increasing prices. Although
investmentdataarenotoriouslydifﬁculttoget, theevidence sofarpointstoaverymod-
est investment size in the maintenance and expansion of utility networks as a general
rule (Gassner et al. 2008).
Ran Kim and Horn (1999, p. 3–4) summarize: “The recent public ﬁnance crises
in many countries, combined with huge investment requirements, have made private-
sector participation necessary. Furthermore, the poor performance of most public en-
terprises and their inability to offer a quality service and meet demand have encour-
aged many governments to turn to the private sector for the provision of infrastructure
services, leading to the need for reforms. However, large companies in developing
and transition economies that were privatized were often sold as monopolies or near-
monopolies. Instead of creating greater competition in the concerned sectors before
privatization, all that has been accomplished is substitution of a private monopoly for
a public one. ... Moreover, much of the so-called ‘privatization’ has really been the
transfer of ownership rights from the federal to regional governments. The problem
is that such transfers have introduced additional elements of confusion into corporate
governance, and created conﬂicting incentives for federal and regional agencies that
function both as owners and as regulators.”
2.2 The model in the literature
With the aim to disentangle the rationale at the basis of production plans as they are
deﬁned by a privatized ﬁrm producing a public utility, we develop hereafter a model
which is close in spirit to the so called plant size problem. This problem typically arises
in industries with ‘natural monopoly’ characteristics where it is possible to compensate
the cost of committing substantial resources for further capacity by the advantage of
investing in advance to demand increases, in order to beneﬁt from large economies of
scale. (Typical examples are given by energy industries, communication networks, and
water resources systems.)
Since the sixties, a considerable amount of work on the plant-size problem, formu-
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lated originally by Chenery (1952) and Manne (1961, 1967), has been developed, and
several variants of the capacity expansion model were used in the operations research
ﬁeld with several applications to public services (Gabszewicz and Vial 1972; Nickell
1977; Freidenfelds 1981; Chaouch and Buzacott 1994; and Ryan 2004). Also, we refer
the interested reader to Luss (1982) and Nam and Logendran (1992) for a survey of the
capacity expansion problem in operational research and its main applications.
The deterministic model by Manne (1961) is concerned with the optimal degree of
excess capacity to be built into a new facility when an exogenous persistent growth in
demand for capacity is anticipated. In a simpliﬁed inﬁnite horizon model, he analyses
the problem faced by a public utility when it is required to meet a linearly growing
demand at a minimum cost and no undercapacity is admitted. Capacity increments for
meeting demand are performed at a diminishing marginal costs (namely, economies of
scale arise) and the cost structure is assumed to last forever (no technological progress).
Typically, this ﬁrm has to deﬁne its optimal policy in terms of expenditure streams,
taking into account that if it builds a single large plant, then it can take advantage of
economies of scale in construction. Alternatively, if it decides to build several smaller
plants at different points of time, there is advantage of delaying a portion of the total
investment and investing the corresponding funds in the capital market.
Manne (1961) ﬁnds that the optimal investment policy is constant-cycle, namely,
it displays a stationarity property: successive investments are all of the same size and
undertaken atequallyspacedpointsoftime. Althoughthisresearchcontributionidenti-
ﬁes the main features of state-owned utility industries when these are facing a capacity
expansion policy, they are exclusively restricted to the investment problem as it is faced
by public utilities. Close in spirit to Manne (1961), we depart from his approach in two
main respects.
First of all, we try to extend the analysis to a demand function which ﬁrst linearly
increases and then decreases over time. From a theoretical viewpoint, assuming that
demand is a function of price and that this function ﬂuctuates over time enriches the
standard model as formulated by Manne (1961, 1967) in two directions. First, demand
is no longer exogenously increasing over time, independently of price, but it depends
explicitly on the price policy selected by the ﬁrm over time. Furthermore it also allows
to consider the phenomenon of cycle, namely phases of boom and recession alternating
over time, which is particularly relevant for the time being.
Moreover, we substitute to the traditional plant size problem a new version, in
which state-owned utilities are changed into proﬁt-maximising entities. As such, a
private ﬁrm is allowed to use speciﬁc instruments which are not available to a public
ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, a privately owned ﬁrm can adopt, in parallel with its investment
policy, a price policy in order to dampen (stimulate) demand over time when demand
level results to be higher (lower) than installed capacity. While recognizing that utility
services belong to the set of basic services and, as a such, their demand does not react
so promptly to price changes, yet assuming a price sensitive demand allows to take into
account how the investment policy is implemented by a proﬁt-maximizing utility in a
market economy.
Our aim is to study the following problem: What is the optimal price policy, and
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the ensuing optimal size of investment, that a privatized utility selects through time
if there are not regulatory constraints? How the resulting sequence of successive in-
vestments through time compares with the optimal sequence under state ownership?
Which lessons can be drawn in terms of welfare?
Ofcourse, theanswertothesequestionswouldbesimpleifthepriceselectedbythe
monopolist would be kept constant over time. Indeed, in this case, the investment size
would be fully determined by the length of the time-interval during which the capacity
of the last investment is sufﬁcient to face the demand level at that price. Yet, the
problem is no longer as simple if we consider at the same time the possibility opened to
themonopolisttomanipulatethepriceovertime. Inthatcase, themonopolistcaneither
change demand by increasing or decreasing the price trajectory or, on the contrary,
beneﬁt from full instantaneous monopoly proﬁt by adapting simply the monopoly price
to the demand pattern.
We prove that when a privatized utility is allowed to combine price and investment
policies, it undertakes an investment size which is lower than the one recommended
by a public monopoly. More precisely, we show that if the investment cost may not be
recoupedbyinstallingfurthercapacity, thenattheoptimalsolutiontheprivatizedutility
quotes a price dampening instantaneous demand at the level of the available capacity
and no investment is undertaken. Alternatively, if the investment cost may well be
recouped by further installation, then a positive investment is realized. Yet, even in this
scenario, theproﬁtmaximizingpolicyconsistsindampeningtheinstantaneousdemand
for some times and installing a capacity which is lower than the one which would be
installed with no price manipulation under public ownership. Finally, we show that
such a type of policy displays a stationarity property, namely repeats identically from
cycle to cycle.
3. The basic framework
Let us consider a monopolist facing a demand function D(t,p(t)), ﬁrst increasing and
then decreasing over time which is deﬁned as follows:
D(t,p(t)) =
n A+t −ti− p for t ∈ [ti,t0
i]
A+ti+1−t − p for t ∈ [t0
i,ti+1],
wheret denotes continuous time, p instantaneous price andt0
i some point in the interval
of time [ti,ti+1]. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the monopolist deﬁnes the
investment size xti at ﬁxed equally spaced points of time ti, i = 0,1,2,...,+¥. Thus, in
the interval [ti,ti+1], the production capacity remains constant. So, at each ti, the ﬁrm
decides the capacity xti to be installed and sets the price p(t) for t ∈ [ti,ti+1]. Then, at
time ti+1, a new investment is undertaken and a new price schedule for this period is
deﬁned, and so on.1
1 These points can be interpreted on the basis of lifetime of the existing capacity. In other words, one can
imagine these time points as being the interval of time after which the existing equipment ceases to be as
good as before and thus investment can be reduced to a replacement or renewal decision. This is in line
with the estimates of investment for basic services showing that a large part of expenditure relates to the
maintenance and renewal of the existing production capacity.
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At each price, in the period of time [ti,t0], t0 =
ti+1+ti
2 , demand expands through
time as the intercept of the demand function grows proportionally to t, and then in
the period [t0
i,ti+1] it decreases through time. It is interesting to notice that if we ﬁx
t0 =ti+1, the problem can be reduced to a traditional capacity expansion problem where
a monopolist is required to deﬁne an optimal policy in terms of price regimes and
investment size to meet a demand function which always grows linearly over time. We
label the point of time t0
i as the turning point. Up to a change of units we set ti = i,
and thus t0 = 1
2 +i. The interval [i,i+1] between two dates at which a new investment
is decided is called cycle, and the periods [i,t0] and [ti,i+1] of increasing demand and
decreasing demand respectively, phases of the cycle.
At each instant of timet, the capacity of the ﬁrm is bounded by the existing amount
of equipment x(t). While the existing capacity may exceed the current demand level
D(t,p(t)), no under-capacity is admitted, so that D(t,p(t)) ≤ x(t), namely the basic
service provided should always meet the existing demand. So, whatever the price
policy which is adopted at each instant, the monopolist must invest in order to meet
the resulting demand. The investment cost for new capacity xi at the beginning of each
cycle i is deﬁned as
f(x) = axi.
This cost structure is assumed to hold forever. The time horizon is unbounded.
In the usual plant size problem, given an exogenous pattern of demand, the se-
quence of capacity investments would be automatically determined by the investment
time points. Yet, when the monopolist can manipulate the price through time, this cor-
respondence ceases to operate since it depends on the price policy selected. A price
policy is a function p(t) which speciﬁes the price announced by the monopolist at each
instant t. Given any price policy, we may associate to it a sequence of investment for
new capacity undertaken at the beginning of each cycle (x0,x1,...,xi,...) = x(p(t)).
Formally the problem is to ﬁnd p(t) and, accordingly x(p(t)) = (x0,x1,...,xi,...),









is maximized, subject to the following capacity constraint
D(t,p(t)) ≤ x(t),
where r denote the interest rate in the capital market, which is assumed to be constant
over time. A policy is said to be optimal when it consists in an optimal price pattern
through time and, as a consequence, an optimal sequence of investment in order to
satisfy demand at each instant of time.
4. The optimal policy
First of all, notice that the optimal policy consists in deﬁning an optimal investment
sequence and an optimal price regime.
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Of course, as far as the optimal investment sequence, it is deﬁned in such a way
that the marginal revenue stemming from a non-negative investment is equal to the
marginal cost of installing this capacity.
As far as the optimal price regime, it is worth stressing that the cost function does
not depend on the choice of p(t). Then, a sufﬁcient condition for the optimality of
p(t) is that it maximizes the integrand p(t)D(t,p(t)) at any point t, given the capacity
constraint. Notice that, within any cycle [i,i+1], the objective function V (t,p(t))














for t ∈ [t0
i,i+1]




s.t. D(t,p(t)) ≤ xi, i = [t].
Whatever the selected sequence of investment size, in each phase two price regimes
may arise, depending on the productive capacity compared with the demand level.
Assumethatduringthephaseofincreasingdemand, atsomedatet, wherei≤t <t0
i,
the capacity constraint is not binding, namely, the demand level at that date t is lower
than the current capacity or D(t,p(t)) < xi. Then, at the optimal policy, p(t) is set
equal to the maximizing price regime pM
B (t) = (A+t −i)/2, as the demand does not
need to be dampened. Yet, the demand expands over time while the installed capacity
remains ﬁxed during the cycle i.




B(t)=A+t−i−xi. At the timet0
i when the phase of decreasing demand
takes place, in spite of the decreasing pattern of demand function, the installed capacity
is not yet sufﬁcient to meet demand. So, the price regime pC
R(t) = A+(i+1)−t −xi
dampening instantaneous demand is used for some instant of time. Then, when the
capacity is sufﬁcient to meet the level of demand corresponding to the instantaneous
monopoly price, this maximizing regime pM
R (t) = (A+i+1−t)/2 is quoted. The
two price patterns pM
B (t) and pC
B(t) quoted during the increasing demand phase, and
pM
R (t) and pC
R(t) quoted during the decreasing demand phase are called monopoly price
regime and constrained price regime, respectively. Of course, if the capacity is such
that it satisﬁes the demand level even at time t0
i, then the constrained regimes never
apply.
Further, we denote by t∗
i (or t∗∗
i ) the point of time when the monopoly price regime
pM
B (t) becomes equal to the constrained price regime pC
B(t) during the increasing de-
mand (or the constrained price regime pC
R(t) becomes equal to the monopoly price
regime pM
R (t) during the decreasing demand) and we label this point as the swit-
ching point t∗
i (or switching point t∗∗
i ). It is easy to verify that t∗
i = 2xi +i−A (or
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t∗∗
i = A+i+1−2xi). Notice also that the value of the switching point t∗∗
i during
the decreasing demand phase depends on the switching time t∗





It derives from (1) that the later the switching time t∗
i —namely the longer the time
when the monopolist quotes the monopoly price regime pM
B (t) in the ﬁrst phase—the
earlier the switching time t∗∗
i —namely the shorter the period of time when the demand
function is dampened by the constrained price regime pC
R(t) during the decreasing de-
mand phase.
4.1 The optimal investment sequence
We start to identify here the optimal sequence of investments, then we move to deﬁne
the optimal price regime in order to fully characterize the optimal policy.
First of all, notice that for an initial investment to be non-negative at the optimal
solution in the cycle [0,1], the marginal revenue stemming from a non-negative invest-
ment must be equal to the marginal cost of installing this capacity, namely:
1 Z
0






























the monopolist refrains from investing, namely x∗ = 0.
Let us brieﬂy summarize the above ﬁnding as follows:






> a holds, the optimal investment policy con-







it consists in zero investment.
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4.2 The optimal price regime
Let us deﬁne now the optimal price regime which completes the global optimal policy
as it is deﬁned by this proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm. We ﬁrst remark here that three price
scenarios may arise within a cycle.
In Scenario A (see Figure 1), the switching point t∗





i]. Then, as the existing capacity sufﬁces to meet this peak at time t0
i, during
the decreasing demand phase the demand function is not dampened and the optimal
price pattern coincides with the monopoly price regime pM








M p p D , =
i ti i+1




B B D p p =
( ) ,
M M
B R D p p =
( ) ,
C M
R R D p p =
i ti
* ti’     ti
*  *    i+1
x*
Figure 2. Demand function in Scenario B
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In Scenario B (see Figure 2), the switching point t∗
i lies between i and t0
i; then, the
ﬁrm quotes the monopoly price regime between i and t∗
i when the installed capacity
sufﬁces to meet the demand level corresponding to the instantaneous monopoly price,
whereas it quotes the constrained regime between t∗
i and t0
i in order to dampen the
demand at the level of the existing capacity. Starting from t0
i the demand function de-
creases over time and, accordingly, the ﬁrm quotes the price regime pC
R(t)=A+i+1−
t−xi so as to contract the demand D(t,p(t)) within the limits imposed by the existing
capacity. When the capacity constraint ceases to be binding, namely D(t,p(t)) < xi,
then ﬁrm switches to the monopoly price regime pM
R (t) = A+i+1−t/2.
In Scenario C (see Figure 3), the switching point t∗
i lies before i; then the mono-
polist is forced to use the constrained price regime during the whole cycle in order to
meet the capacity constraint.




B R D p p =
Figure 3. Demand function in Scenario C
We prove that quoting the monopoly regime for the whole cycle is never proﬁt-
maximizing, namely that the switching point t∗
i can never be exactly equal to the point
t0
i, excluding thereby Scenario A.
Proposition 2. During any phase [i,t0
i[, it is proﬁt-maximizing to quote—either for a
part or for the whole phase—a price higher than a monopoly tariff, in such a way to
dampen the demand at the level corresponding to the available productive capacity.
Proof. See Appendix.
We deduce from the above that only the two remaining scenarios can be observed at
an optimal price policy. The optimal price pattern within the cycle must either consist
of alternating in the phase of increasing demand the monopoly regime and after the
switching point t∗
i , the constrained regime, and in the phase of decreasing demand the
constrained regime and after the switching point t∗∗
i , the monopoly regime; or quoting
always the instantaneous constrained price.
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The ﬁrst alternative corresponds to a situation where the capacity installed at time
i is large enough to serve the monopoly demand for some period during the increasing
demand, so that the switching point t∗
i is interior to this phase.
The second one holds when the investment at time i is so low that it is even not





Taking into account that the global of optimal policy depends both on the invest-
ment policy, and on the price policy since the investment must meet demand and de-
mand depends on price policy, we can easily conclude that when the optimal capacity
x∗
i installed at time i is positive, then ﬁrm alternates both the price regimes; otherwise,
if no investment is undertaken, namely x∗ = 0, then the constrained regime only arises.
Combining the results in Proposition 1 and 2, we can state the following:






> a holds, the optimal policy consists in a
positive investment and involves both the monopoly and constrained price regimes.






< a, the optimal policy consists in
zero investment and the constrained price regime only applies.
Noticealso, thatsuchtypeofpolicyrepeatsidenticallyfromacycletoanother, namely:
Proposition 4. The optimal policy is stationary through all cycles.
Proof. See Appendix.
5. Some welfare considerations
Now, let us brieﬂy consider how the above problem would have been faced by a pub-
lic utility in order to get some insights on the effects of a change in ownership on
investment and prices.
To this aim, without loss of generality, consider the cycle [i,i+1]. First notice that
if no price manipulation is consented, as no undercapacity is admitted, then the mo-
nopolist invests a time i in such a way as to meet a demand whose pattern is fully
determined by a price corresponding to the perfect competitive equilibrium price. In-
deed, in the case of public utilities with government operating the service, quite often
a price equal to marginal cost and a lump-sum subsidy to keep the ﬁrm operating have
been observed (see Ran Kim and Horn 1999 for details on this).
With a constant returns technology, this price is equal to the marginal investment
cost a. Accordingly, the value of the demand function at price p=a and at each instant
t in the interval writes as:
D(t,p(t)) =
n A+t −ti−a for t ∈ [ti,t
0
i]
A+ti+1−t −a for t ∈ [t
0
i,ti+1]
Of course, ceteris paribus, at each instant of time, the higher any constant price ap-
plied during the cycle, the lower the corresponding demand level and thus the lower the
peak that demand function reaches at time t0
i. That is to say, the closer the equilibrium
price to a monopoly regime, the lower the demand level at any instant of time within
the cycle, and the lower its peak at time t0
i. First, notice that the optimal increment
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of capacity chosen by the privatized monopolist manipulating demand through price
never exceeds the one resulting from the instantaneous monopoly price, as proved in
Proposition 1. Furthermore, and, a fortiori, it cannot exceeds the increment of capa-
city needed to meet demand corresponding to the constant competitive price a. For
example, in the cycle [0,1], t0 = 1/2, the investment x for meeting a demand function
corresponding to the price a is equal to A+1/2−a; whereas the investment undertaken
by a privatized utility is equal to 2A+1/4. In other words:
Proposition 5. The optimal increment of capacity chosen by a privatized utility is
necessarily smaller than the increment of capacity selected by a state-owned utility
facing the level of demand corresponding to the competitive price.
6. Conclusion
Our main ﬁnding, as just stated in the above proposition, is of course derived within
a speciﬁc framework, where we only consider how a change in ownership affects the
economic behaviour of a ﬁrm. Thus, we do not take into account here that the privati-
zation plans are sometimes coupled to a weak legal environment and often biased by
corruption in management (see for details Megginson and Netter 2001). Not even, we
consider whether pace and methods of privatization can affect the rationale of planning
investment adopted by the privatized entities and the ability of these entities to take ad-
vantage of technological progress. Moreover, we do not allow for a different behavior
corresponding to different types of new private owners, either foreign or domestic.
Still, in spite of all these drawbacks, the framework as it is now allows to illustrate
risks deriving from privatizing utilities when the institutional environment is not suited
for a market economy. Indeed, our major conclusion implies that, without the interven-
tion of public authorities, privatization of a state owned ﬁrm must necessarily lead to
a contraction in the path of production investment as settled by a public utility. Thus,
the above comparison can be viewed as being a means for analysing welfare effects
induced by privatization reform when initiated in a lacking regulatory framework. It is
worth noting that as our model considers the economic behaviour of a privatized utility
as it develops over time, welfare losses are likely to emerge in each cycle, if no change
in the institutional environment takes place.
Finally, our ﬁndings are in line with the view introduced by Stiglitz (1999) and
then largely shared (Kennedy 1999; Nellis 1999; Wood 2004; Lieberman and Kopf
2007) that a ﬁrm’s economic performance during transition from a planned-economy
to a market structure is deeply affected not only by its public or private ownership
but also, and even more, by the regulatory structure and economic environment where
it operates. Ran Kim and Horn (1999, p. 6) when describing Stiglitz’ work (1999)
write: “By looking at the example of China vis-` a-vis the former socialist economies,
he [Stiglitz] concludes that effective competition and regulatory policies are important,
rather than privatization itself. China had shown that an economy might achieve more
effective growth by focusing ﬁrst on competition, leaving privatization until later. In
contrast, competition remains thwarted in many of the former socialist economies that
pursued privatization ﬁrst, demonstrating that without effective competition and reg-
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ulatory policies, private rent-seeking can be every bit as powerful, and perhaps even
more distortionary, than public rent-seeking. By looking at the example of China vis-` a-
vis the former socialist economies, concludes that effective competition and regulatory
policies are important, rather than privatization itself.”
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
First, notice that the above proposition is equivalent to say that during any phase [i,t0
i]
the switching point t∗
i belongs either to the interior of the cycle, or it is strictly smaller
than i. Assume that, for some i, x0







i). Then, the monopolist can quote
the monopoly price regimes pM
B (t) and pM
R (t) during the whole phases of increasing
demand and decreasing demand, respectively. The present value of the discounted
















Assume now that the capacity drops by a small quantity e so that x0
i−e < DM(t0
i)
with 0 < e < 1. The monopolist gains the discounted cost saved by reducing the in-
vestment e, namely ea(e−ri −e−r(i+1)). Yet, the demand is not completely met. This
induces to switch from the monopoly price regime pM
B (t) to the constrained regime
pC
B(t) in the phase of increasing demand and to alternate the constrained price regime
pC
R(t) and the monopoly regime pM
R (t) in the phase of decreasing demand. Thus, the























































where the third and fourth integrals denote the revenue stemming from using the con-
strained price regimes between t0
i −d and t0
i, t0
i and t0
i +d, respectively, and e = d/2.
Subtracting (3) from (2) yields the loss L resulting from alternating monopoly price
regimes and constrained regimes in the cycle rather then using solely the monopoly
















































This loss L is a function of third order in e, as it is given by the integral of a function of





is of ﬁrst order in e. Accordingly, for e small enough, the net
loss should be negative, which is the desired contradiction. ￿
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Proof of Proposition 4.
Let us ﬁrst remark the following, which will be used below. The optimal capacity
investments x0
is are the solution of








both in the case when the optimal price policy consists in alternating the monopoly
price regime and the constrained regime, and in the case when the constrained regime
applies during the whole cycle.
Further, notice that the switching pointt∗
i exists, it is unique for each cycle [i,i+1],
andunivocally entailstheswitchingpointt∗∗
i . Accordingly, ifweprove thattheoptimal
investment policy is constant size, the optimal price policy repeats identically from a
cycle to the other.




























i −i)−s)e−rsds = ae−ri(1−e−r), (4)
where s = A+t −i. Taking into account that t0
i = 1/2+i and t∗∗
i = 2i+1−t∗




























(1−e−r) is a function that does not depend
on i. As t∗
i < i+1/2 for any i, it is immediate to see that t∗
i = i+l where l is the
unique solution to F(l) = a. Then, given the time i when the increment of capacity
is installed, t∗
i is univocally determined by l, which does not depend on i, for any
i. Finally, as t∗
i identiﬁes the level of available capacity xi in any cycle [i,i+1], the
solution is stationary, as claimed.
Let us move now to the case when the marginal cost of undertaking a non-negative
investment is not compensated by the revenue stemming from this investment. Thus,
the monopolist refrains from investing, namely x∗
i = 0, and constrained regime only
applies. As this condition does not depend on the cycle i, so that x∗
i = x∗ = 0, this
policy repeats identically from a cycle to another. ￿
78 AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 4, no. 1